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This paper examines the contractual basis of athlete selection and 
proposes  that  the  authority  to  make  selection  is  confined  to  the 
express   and   implied   contractual   terms   describing   the  selection 
process. The paper first considers selections made "objectively" and 
mandated  through  express contractual  terms. "Subjective"  regimes 
of selection are then considered and the suggestion made that despite 
selectors possessing the contractual power to apply their own opinion 
in  making  selections  the entitlement  is not  unfettered.  Under  such 
regimes selectors are obliged, through implication, to apply their 
discretion  honestly and in good faith. It is further proposed that the 
application   of  a  term  of  selection  is  constrained  by  matters  of 





One is hard-pressed to think of any sporting event, team or individual which 
does not require contending athletes to undergo a process of selection; a means 
by which some emerge and others are eliminated. In many events the selection is 
a  matter of ranking, in other cases selection is made by a coach or a panel 
exercising nothing more than a personal view of who should be included or 
excluded. For the athlete much rides on this process of selection - selection can 
lead to  prize  money, match payments, personal pride and  national acclaim, 
standing on a podium, greater wealth, a university scholarship, advertisements 
and product endorsement. It can also mean the difference between a job as a 
labourer or an athlete, and later, a job as a commentator or national coach. To be 
selected once -just once -can make it all happen, or at least give it a chance of 
happening. Not to be selected can mean years of effort down the drain and 
relative oblivion. 
 
Most athletes competing for team selection believe they will be chosen if they 
are the best athlete. What if the athlete is the best athlete and is not selected - is 
there any recourse to law? This article explores the relationship between athletes 
and their sporting organisations in respect of selection, with particular regard to 
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For  the purpose of context consider  the concerns,  legal  and otherwise,  arising 
from   the   non-selection   of   Newcastle   Knights   rugby   league   player   Kirk 
Reynoldson  in 2007. Under the terms of his contract, Reynoldson, upon playing 
15 first grade games, would be granted a new 2008 contract  paying $200,000  a 
season.  With  three  games  remaining  in  the  season  Reynoldson  had  already 
played  14 games. He was not selected  to play his 15th game and his contract 
with the Newcastle Club lapsed. Statistics  were produced  to show Reynoldson 
was a better performer than others who had taken the field over preceding weeks. 
The media claimed the coach was so concerned with the propriety of leaving 
Reynoldson  out of the side that he took "his selected team to the Knights board 
for approval knowing that Reynoldson"s exclusion  would cause further howls of 
protest  among players and supporters". 1 Reynoldson  was reported to have been 
offered a new contract with the Newcastle Club but "with a significant pay cut".2 
The Newcastle Club claimed Reynoldson's non-selection  was merely a matter of 
on-field form. The Newcastle Club was not in a position to make the semi-finals, 
irrespective of who was selected, fostering speculation that the club had nothing 
to lose in selecting less capable players. Furthermore,  a salary cap imposed  on 
clubs  in  the  NRL competition  meant  a club  could  be advantaged  in  losing  a 
player at the end of a season  to make room for other players in the following 
season- perhaps players of outstanding talent. 
 
The  Reynoldson  case is an example  illustrating  the anxiety  athletes  and  their 
advisers may feel towards the processes of selection. The obvious concern is the 
possible manipulation of the selection process by a sporting organisation to fulfil a  
purpose  ulterior  to the contractual  intention  of the parties. There is, perhaps, 
some temptation to dismiss events such as Reynoldson's as mere sporting 
melodrama,  but for the individual  wrongly excluded  the matter is serious  and 
costly - no less so than any purported breach of contract is for any individual - 




The contractual basis of sports selection 
 
The  relationship   between  an  organisation   and  an  athlete   is  almost  always 
contractual,  as are the terms governing  the selection  process. 3  Upon signing an 
agreement an athlete contracts to abide by the selection process, as does the club 
and other signatory athletes. Where athletes are not co-signatories a multipartite 
contractual  relationship  may be inferred. In  Integrated Computer Services Pty 
 
 
1 B. Toohey, "Cruel Knights Dump Reyno," The Daily Telegraph, 15 August 2007. 
2 B. Toohey, "Buderus: We need Reyno," The Daily Telegraph, 7 August 2007. 
3  Excluding of course those consensual arrangements which come under the rule in Cameron  & 
Other.s v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358, the principle being, that the court has no jurisdiction to intetfere 
in matters of consensual arrangement which evince no intention by the parties to be legally bound. 
Note there are many exceptions - in the main where there is a contractual intention or threat to 
proprietary interests. 
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Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd McHugh J observed that a contract 
may be inferred where, "conduct ... viewed in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances shows a  tacit  understanding or  agreement."4   To  illustrate, in 
Raguz  v Sullivan,5   a case involving a selection dispute between two judokas 
competing for a place in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the fact that the contending 
athletes were not co-signatories to a particular document governing selection was 
irrelevant  to claims there was no contractual  relationship  between  the athletes. 
Spigelman CJ and Mason P noted: 
 
"Each  athlete knew  that every other  member  of the  Shadow  Team 
would  both  be  shown  the  Selection   Agreement  and  required  to 
execute   the  standard   Nomination   Form   (and   subsequently   the 
standard Team Membership Agreement). This was plainly intended to 
be an integrated scheme, particularly in a context where a claim by 
one athlete to a right of nomination  (or selection)  may,  and in the 
present case must, have the consequence  of denying nomination (or 
selection) to another."6 
 
To  challenge  his or  her non-selection  an athlete  wiii need  to establish  that a 
contract governed the selection process and that the selection process was not 
followed. That is, the athlete must prove a breach of the express or implied 
contractual terms governing the means of selection. 
 
 




Some contracts expressly state  the criteria  applicable for selection to a team of 
event. For example, Swimming  Australia required swimmers for nomination for 
the Beijing Olympic team to "have placed 1st or 2"d Australian (in each gender) 
at the 2008 Telstra Australian Open Swimming Championships". Under these 
schemes the selection of athletes is "objective" given that the subjective opinion 




In  certain  .sports there  are  no  listed  criteria  governing  selection.  Under  such 
regimes selections are based on the judgment of individual selectors or panels of 
selectors  as to the relative worth of individual athletes. Selection in this sense is 
"subjective", being dependent on the individual  selector's  view of the worth of 
 
 
4  Integrated Computer Services Pty Ltd v Digital Equipment Corp (Aust) Pty Ud  (1988)  5 BPR 
11,1 10 at 11,117 per McHugh JA. 
5 Raguz v Sullivan (2000) NSWCA 240. See also Daley v NSW Rugby League lJd [1995]  NSWIRC 
t83. 
6 Raguz v Sullivan (2000)  NSWCA 240 at [80}. 
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an athlete. Where an athlete complains of non-selection he or she may argue that 
a term of selection by merit is to be implied into the subjective selection regime. 
 
Objective and subjective criteria 
 
Some  sporting organisations  reserve the right to reject an athlete who, although 
meeting   the  objective   standard   of  selection,   is  otherwise   subjectively   not 
suitable. For example, the Athletics Australia nomination criteria for the Beijing 
Olympics stated that: "As a general rule Athletics Australia will only choose 
Athletes  to be nominated to the Australian Olympic Committee  for inclusion in 
the 2008 Australian Olympic Team who selectors believe current results and 
previous major international results indicate that the athlete is capable of 





The fear that outstanding competitors may be lost to an event through accident 
appears to have prompted some sporting organisations to incorporate an 
essentially  subjective "Illness/Misadventure/Extenuating Circumstances" term 
into the sporting contract. For example, Cycling Australia's nomination criteria 
for the Beijing Olympics allowed the National Selection Committee at their 
discretion to give weight to extenuating circumstances arising from: 
 
"(a) injury or illness; 
(b) equipment failure; 
(c) travel delays; 
(d) bereavement; and/or 
(e) any other factors reasonably considered .[to] constitute 
extenuating  circumstances". 
On the other hand, a sporting organisation may attempt to prevent athletes from 
making use of extenuating circumstances in appealing their non-selection. For 
example, the Boxing Australia Olympic selection criteria for Beijing stated: "For 
the purposes of determining whether an athlete or team has met the requirements 
of this Selection Criteria, BAI (Boxing Australia Incorporated) will not have 
regard to any extenuating circumstances."8 
 
Although contractual terms regarding extenuating circumstances often possess a 
wide ambit, an action in contract remains should the provision be applied 




7 2008 Australian Olympic Team, Athletics Australia Nomination Criteria, s A(2). 
8 2008 Australian Olympic Team- Boxing Australia Nomination Criteria, s 8. 
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Contract and objective selection regimes 
 
A selection is purely "objective" where based on known and inalterable criteria 
rather than through the subjective opinion of selectors. The athlete is selected 
because he or she is the superior athlete according to these criteria. Commonly, 
the athlete finishes first, throws further, lifts more, scores more points or betters 
opponents. Swimming, athletics and golf are obvious examples. 
 
The  advantage  of  objective  selection  is  that  of  certainty.  The  athlete  knows 
precisely the performance requirements  necessary to ensure his or her entry into 
the team. From the organisation's perspective the advantage is similar, though 
bought  at  the  cost  of  flexibility.  When,  during  selection  trials  for  the  2004 
Olympics, 400 metres world record holder Ian Thorpe fell into the pool prior to 
the firing  of the starting  gun and was disqualified,  the eventual  winner, Craig 
Stevens, was contractually entitled to swim in that event at Athens despite 
(apparently) being a lesser talent. Had selectors removed Stevens in favour of the 
record  holder  it is likely  that Stevens  could  have successfully  challenged  for 
breach of contract.9 
 
In contracts mandating an objective regime of selection, the complaining athlete 
need merely  prove  the objective  criteria  were not applied. Where  athletes  are 
ranked according to their relative ability there are, obviously, few problems in 
proving one athlete superior to another. Where, however, a subjective form of 
assessment is added to existing objective criteria the athlete's  prospects of 
successfully  challenging  his or her omission  diminish. The complaining athlete 
must then prove that the selected  athlete  was chosen  without correct  reference 
being made  to the implied  terms governing  selection  - a difficult  task where 
selectors  are  granted  significant  autonomy.  The  case  of  Forbes  v  Australian 
Yachting   Federation 10   involved   a  challenge   to  selection   for   the  Tornado 
Yachting class 1996 Olympic team. Criteria of selection were both objective and 
subjective. Objective criteria required boat crews to compete in two specified 
regattas removing all discretion, according to Santow J, to select crews who did 
not sail in these events. The  plaintiffs claimed  that a crew  had changed a few 
team members  and should,  on  that basis,  be excluded  from  the Olympic  team 
arguing that points should not be carried over from the "old" to the "new" crew. 
Santow J found  there was "no  express  prohibition  upon future alteration"  and 
that the selection of a "crew" did not mean crew-members could not be changed. 
According  to his Honour,  the purpose of selecting crews  was to create a team 
 
 
9 In a gesture of good will Stevens ultimately withdrew in favour of Thorpe who went on to win the 
event at Athens. 
1°Forbes v Australian Yachting Federation Inc SCNSW 1467 of 1996 BC960I099 (4 Aprill996). 
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"with the best chance of winning medals at the 1996 Olympic Games", such that 
the "guidelines  are clearly designed to serve that purpose and circumstances may 
well arise where they need modification to do so". 11 
 
 
Contract and subjective selection regimes 
 
Subjective selection occurs where an athlete is selected according to the opinion 
or judgment of a selector. Often there are no express guidelines which ensure 
flexibility  in selection and  utilise the expert  knowledge  of  the selectors. Even 
where statistics  are available to guide selection, such as goals scored or tackles 
made,  selectors  are  free  to  ignore  these  statistics   in  the  exercise  of  their 
judgment. Indeed, depending on the terms of the contract, it may be permissible 
to  select  a  less  skilled  player  given  his or  her  "fit"  within  a particular  team 
structure. 
 
Athletes  aggrieved at  their non-selection  may argue  that an implied  term  was 
ignored  and, as such, the athlete  was wrongfully  denied  entry  to the team. In 
almost all cases the proposed implied term is one requiring selection to be based 
on "merit".  That is, the complaining  athlete claims he or she is more worthy of 
selection than the athlete selected in his or her stead. Of course, the argument is 
confined to subjective selection processes given that objective selection is, by 
definition, based on non-personal indicators of merit. 
 
Subjective   selection  is  common  to  interactive  team  sports  (particularly   ball 
sports)   where  the  variety  of  skills  and  a  preponderance   of  unquantifiable 
capacities exclude objective measure. Obvious examples are netball, AFL, rugby 
and  soccer.  In  practice,  selectors  must  balance  out  the  relative  strengths  of 
players across a range of attributes such as ball skills, agility, speed, endurance, 
and courage, amongst many others and perhaps, ultimately, base the selection on 
their overall impression. Any guidelines of selection are often very general 
permitting  selectors  to  apply  their  opinions  freely.  For  example,  the Hockey 
Australia selection policy states that players will be: 
 
"assessed ... on their ability to perform at the highest level as part of 
the   Australian   team.   They   must   meet   acceptable   performance 
standards and requirements of national coaches. Assessments will be 
made on player performance in international competition, Australian 
Hockey  Leagues,  Australian  championships,  regional  competitions, 
club fixtures, training camps and training sessions."  12 
 
Often under such schemes there is no regulation of the selection process. For 
example, in Daley v NSW Rugby League Ltd the court was informed that, "there 
 
 
11 Forbes  v Australian  Yachting  Federation Inc SCNSW 1467 of 1996 BC9601099  at BC 62-63. 
12 2008 Australian Olympic Team, Hockey Australia Selection  Policy. 
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are no guidelines, resolutions or directives to the selectors as to matters required 
to be taken into consideration ... it is not possible to specify all the considerations 
which enter into the selection or to generalise as to that matter. Furthermore, the 
process of selection is, by  its very nature largely subjective and the selectors 
often disagree on relative playing merits of players and the appropriate reason or 
reasons for which they should or should not be selected." 13 
 
With an emphasis upon the personal judgment of selectors, subjective selections 
are, for two reasons, difficult to challenge in breach of contract. One, there are no 
objective criteria acting as terms of the contract to match against the relative 
performances of athletes and, two, the selectors are permitted, under contract, to 
apply their good judgment  to the selection  process rather than that of, say, the 




Subjective criteria  and implied contractual  terms 
 
The basis of implication 
 
A term may be implied  into a contract where doing so is necessary to give the 
contract its proper and intended operation. The court, in essence, fills a gap in the 
text of the contract by incorporating an implied term. In Codelfa Constructions v 
State  Rail  Authority  an  implied  term  was described  as: ".... one  which  it  is 
presumed that the parties would have agreed upon had they turned their minds to 
it - it is not a term  that they  have actually  agreed  upon". 14  An implied  term 
carries the same contractual  authority as an express term and, where repudiated, 
may give  rise to a suit in  breach of contract. In  BP Refinery  (Westernport)  v 
Shire of Hastings 15   the court stated  that a term may be implied  into a contract 
where it is: 
 
• reasonable and equitable; 
 
• necessary to give the contract business efficacy; 
 
• so obvious it goes without saying; 
 
• capable of clear expression; and 
 
• does not contradict an express term. 
 
There has been, it may be noted, some debate as to whether every element must 
necessarily   be  present   before   a  term  can  be  implied   into  a  contract   or, 
 
 
13 Daley vNSW Rugby League l.Jd [1995] NSWIRC 183 affidavit of Don Furner. 
14 Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337 at 
346 per Mason J.                                                                                                              · 
15 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty  Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266 per Privy  Council 
approved in Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 
CLR337. 
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alternatively,  whether the element "efficacy"  and the element "obviousness" are 
singularly and separately sufficient.16 
 
In addition to the fonnula espoused in BP Refinery (Westernport) it may also be 
necessary to imply a term to give the proper and intended application to a 
particular word used within a contract. In Brambles Holdings Ltd v Bathurst City 
Council Heydon JA observed that terms may be implied through "implications 
contained in the express words of the contract". There Brambles contracted to 
manage the Council's garbage depot and collect "general commercial  waste" in 
return for retaining a percentage of the fee charged to depositors of garbage. At 
first the only waste collected was "dry waste". Brambles,  after some time, came 
to accept liquid waste and claimed it was entitled  to retain ail fees for this form 
of waste as it "had no contract with Council for liquid disposal". The appeal 
concerned   the  interpretation   the  trial  judge  had  given  the  words  "general 
commercial  waste"  when determining  that  commercial  waste included "liquid 
waste". In explaining  the ruling the trial judge stated, "this is not an implication 
of a tenn ... on the basis of business efficacy; but rather the drawing out of what 
is implied  by the language of  the contract  itself'. 17 Heydon JA approved  and 
noted  that  implication  from  express  words  "employed  processes  of 
construction".18 In this sense a term is implied,  as a matter of construction,  to 
give  the correct  legal effect  to the word in question. That  is, an express  word 
implies, or connotes, a function in addition to its literal meaning. For example, a 
term may be implied to give legal effect  of the word "selection"  used within a 
sporting contract- what did the parties intend the legal effect of "selection" to be 
when they chose that word to be included in the contract. 
 
Subjective selection  and implication in fact 
 
Where  the tenn "selection" appears in a sporting contract, an aggrieved athlete 
may  ask  the court  to  imply  an additional  tenn;  that selection  is to  be  made 
according  to "merit".19 To do so requires  the court  to consider  the elements  of 
implication.  To  paraphrase  Code/fa,  if  the  organisation  and  the athlete  were 
asked if selection  was to be merit based, they would reply "that is so obvious it 
goes without saying". The court must also be satisfied that the term to be implied 
meets the other requirements of implication, in particular whether the implication 
is  necessary  "to  give  business  efficacy  to  the  transaction  as must  have  been 
intended  at  all  events  by  both  parties  ..."20.   In  essence,  is  the  implied  term 




16 JM Paterson, "Tenns implied in fact: The basis for implication", (1998) 13 JCL 103. 
17 Brambles  Holdings Ud  v Bathurst City Council  [2001]  NSWCA 61 at [28] per Heydon JA. 
18 Brambles Holdings  Ud  v Bathurst City Council  [2001]  NSWCA 61 at [28] per Heydon JA. 
19 There  may be other  implications apart from  merit, such  as building  a team for the future,  which 
would require a different argument. 
20 The Moorcock  (1889) 14 PD 64. At least where a single element  is thought to be insufficient. 
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imply  a term  of merit  will hinge on the intention of the parties  inferred from  the 
purpose to be achieved under the contract: 
 
"The   so-called  implication  in  fact  is  really  implication  by  judge 
based on the judge's view of the actual intention of the parties drawn 
from the circumstances  of the particular contract, its language, and 
its purposes. "21 
 
By way of simple illustration; if  the predominant intention is to win the 
competition, a  term of  selection on  merit is  more readily implied into  the 
contract  than  where,  say,  the intention is to create  a balance between youth  and 
experience or where  the purpose is merely  to enjoy  the company of fellow  team 
mates. 
 
In Zusman v Royal Western Australian Bowling Association (Inc) the purpose to 
be achieved in selecting the Western  Australia  bowls  team prompted the court  to 
imply   a  term  of  merit  into   the  contract.  Zusman,  the  plaintiff,  believed   the 
executive of  the Bowling Association had interfered with  the selection process 
and  in so doing  expunged merit  as a criteria  of selection. Zusman  argued  "there 
is to be implied  into the agreement between  the members and  the Association on 
a  term   that  the  selectors  would   act  fairly". The   Association  countered  that 
Zusman  had been  treated  fairly,  "and  even if he has not, there is no obligation to 
be fair  to the plaintiff  or indeed  to other  members of the Association hopeful  for 
selection".22 McKechnie J saw "fair" as meaning "a fair  review  of his merits  by 
the selectors ..."23• 
 
The  purpose of the selection process  in this case  was to supply  top-rated  players 
to  represent  the  State.   Meeting  this   purpose  then   required  as  a  matter   of 
implication that  those  of  greater   merit  be  selected   over  those  of  lesser  merit. 
McKechnie J stated: 
 
"A  term  may  be  implied  into  a  contract  if it  is  so  obvious  that 
anybody asked would have said in effect, 'That goes without saying'. 
 
"Selection  for the state team is no doubt the desire of all competitive 
bowlers.  If they  were to  be told that the  selection  process does not 
have  to  be  fair  and  it  may  consider  anything  the  selectors  wish, 






21 Renard  Constructions (ME) Pty Ud v Minister of Public Works (1992)  26 NSWLR  234 at 255 per 
Priestley JA. 
22 Zusman  v Royal Western  Australian Bowling  Association  (Inc) {1999] WASC 86 at [3]. 
23 Zusman  v Royal Western  Australian Bowling  Association  (Inc) I1999] WASC 86 at [44]. 
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rude and  resounding. In my view the  plaintiff has established an 
arguable case that there is such a term of fairness to be implied. "24 
 
In  Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club in contrast,  merit selection  as it 
related to business efficacy was not implied. Farrell, a squash player, claimed she 
had "been denied the privileges and  benefits associated with membership ... 
which includes the right to be considered  for selection to represent the (Club)". 
Farrell sought to have implied into her contractual arrangements with the Club, a 
term that selection was to be based on "ability".25 Farrell had lived in England 
for some time and had competed  on  the professional  circuit  and in the British 
Open. Johnson  J found  her to be, at the relevant time, "a  world class  masters 
squash player and ... on ability alone, would have been suitable for selection in 
an  A  grade  pennant  team."26   Evidence  indicated  personal  animosity  towards 
Farrell and that she had been omitted from the team because the Ladies Captain 
and other team members did not wish to play with her. 
 
Johnson J considered the case in respect of the "elements" of implication27   and 
referred to the Constitution of the Club, the pertinent clause reading: 
 
"The objects for which the Club is established are to promote and 
encourage the playing of lawn tennis, squash and other sports and for 
those  purposes ...  to  promote, hold,  or ellter into tournaments  and 
other competitions and matches ..."28 
 
His Honour found the business purpose of the contract was for members the use 
and enjoyment of club facilities, rather than the fielding of representative teams 
and was, as such, "workable and commercially  effective without the implication 
of the proposed term". The club existed to promote the sport of squash and "the 
evidence is that the management are content for members to form their own team 
if they wish". His Honour found that to imply a term of fairness would put the 
club to the expense and inconvenience  of "obtaining  a11 relevant information  ... 
maintaining awareness of changes in performance, identifying and justifying the 
basis of decisions  ... It  is difficult  to accept  the management  of  a voluntary 
organisation, established to promote and encourage the playing of certain sports 
at an amateur and social level, would envisage such an obligation."29 Similarly, 
given the nature of the club it did not "go without saying", that the membership 
contract  implied  a  term  of  merit  selection.  Furthermore,  there  was  evident 
difficulty  in  determining  how  the  implied  term  Farrell  suggested  should  be 
 
24 Zusman v Royal Western Australian Bowling Association (Inc) [1999] WASC 86 at [32-33}. 
l5 Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [75]. 
26 Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [14] and [81]. 
21 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings (1977) 180 CLR 266. 
28  Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [72]. Note that Farrell's case 
included breaches of both the rules of the Club as an incorporated association and a breach of 
common law contractual obligations. 
29 Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [118]. 
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expressed: "It is by no means clear that it is the proposed term which the parties 
would have agreed on, in the event that they agreed to there being a fair selection 
process." It  would be a "matter of  speculation". 30  His Honour summarised: 
"Success  in competition is not an object of the Club."31 
 
The  plaintiff,  Ms  Farrell,  may  have  been  successful  had  the  sole  object  of 
playing been that of "winning" rather than of promoting  the game of squash. In 
this respect Johnson J drew a distinction between selection for State 
representation    as   per   Zusman,   where   the   purpose   was  to   win,   and  the 
circumstances  of Farrell's non-selection: 
 
"The  defendant's position is that  the  proposed  implied  tenn  is not 
necessary  to  give  the  Contract  business  efficacy.  The  Constitution 
defines the membership category by reference to use certain facilities, 
not by  reference to pennant competition.  Further, it is said that the 
evidence   shows  that  while  membership   is  necessary  to  enable  a 
player to play pennant squash for the Club, the converse is not true. A  
member  need not play pennants and,  in fact, the majority do not. 
Significantly,  a member can play pennants for someone else without 
losing   the  entitlements   of  membership.   I  accept   each   of  these 
statements of fact. ... I accept the proposition that the test of necessity 
for   business    efficacy   is  more   easily   met   with   respect   to   the 
implication  identified in this case, where the Club is constituted  for 
the  purposes  of  playing  a  particular  sport.  I would  add  that  the 
argument  that there is an obvious need for a selection process to be 
conducted fairly in order for the Contract to have business efficacy, is 
strengthened  considerably where ...  the club or the State association 
for a particular sport and carries out selection for membership  of a 
State team. "32 
 
Ms Farrell's difficulty  was that the purpose of the membership  contract was to 
use club facilities and to promote the game of squash. Johnson J linked the object 
and purpose  of the contract with business efficacy  and accepted  the proposition 
that if the Association  were formed for the purpose  of playing  pennant squash 
and if the "contract  of membership for all its members were solely referrable to 
that  purpose  ...  it  could  well  be  arguable  that  the  Contract  lacked  business 
efficacy  if it did not include a process of selection".33  In short, it could not be 
implied that selections  were intended to be merit-based  when this would defeat 
the  express  purpose  of  forming  a  team  in  the  first  place.  As  suggested  by 
Johnson J, had the purpose been to select a "State team" the outcome could have 
 
 
3° Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [135-136]. 
31 Farrell  v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [131]. 
32 Farrell  v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [123]. 
33 Farrell  v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [123]. 
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been different. Playing at State level is not, of course, done with the intention of 
socialising- it is to win. 
 
Johnson  J in Farrell drew a clear distinction between the facts in that case and 
those of Zusman. According to his Honour "...  the principal basis on  which 
Zusman  can  be  distinguished  is  that  the  defendant  party   was  the  State 
organisation  for the particular sport and had the responsibility for selection of the 
State team. A failure to act fairly would have grave consequences for those 
seeking selection in the State team".34  It would seem that the grave consequences 
his Honour  was referring  to were those arising from the selection not achieving 
the contracted intention of the parties and the more meritorious of players being 
excluded from State representation. 
 
In De Pasquale v The Australian  Chess Federation35  the plaintiff sought a 
declaration from the court that the failure of the Chess Federation to select him 
for a Chess Olympiad to be held in Istanbul, Turkey, was invalid. The selection 
by-laws established criteria for selecting team members: 
 
" (a) selectors may consider whatever information in respect of each 
candidate as they may consider relevant. 
(b) Selectors shall list all applicants in order of playing strength ... " 
 
The plaintiff proposed the existence of an "implied term to act fairly was 
variously expressed as containing an obligation to give due weight to current 
form  or,  alternatively, as  a  process of  replacing or  overriding selection  in 
accordance with the criteria of playing strength...".36 
 
Whilst the term "playing strength" was indicative of merit the contract did not 
mandate "current form" as the only measure of merit. The rules permitted the 
selectors to consider any information they thought relevant in ranking according 
to "playing strength" - a subjective appraisal. That is, the selection by-law only 
mandated that "relevant" matters be considered and further, that which was to be 
deemed "relevant" was a decision for the selectors alone. The defendant did, 
however, admit to the existence of an implied obligation not to take, "completely 
irrelevant considerations into account".37  Gray J described evidence regarding 
the assessment of "current form" as serving to "confirm what a subjective and 
uncertain concept it is".38 
 
Where the job of selectors is to rank players according to merit but, where in 
doing so, the selectors are permitted to consider wide criteria, it is extremely 
 
34 Farrell  v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [130]. 
35 De Pasquale  v The Australian  Chess Federation Incorporated [2000] ACTSC 94. 
36 De Pasquale  v The Australian  Chess Federation Incorporated  [2000] ACTSC 94 at {13]. 
37 De Pasquale  v The Australian  Chess Federation Incorporated  [14]. 
38 De Pasquale  v The Australian  Chess Federation Incorporated  [20]. 
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difficult  for  an  aggrieved  athlete  to  successfully   challenge  his  or  her  non- 
selection  on grounds  of  breach of an implied  term. In  such  circumstances  an 
implied term could well, impermissibly,39contradict an express term authorising 
selectors to use their own judgment. As such, provided the selection is an honest 
exercise of judgment the decision will be unassailable. 
 
In passing, it is worth noting that the intention of contracting parties is taken to 
be the intention  existing at the time of contracting. The attention to timing can 
become important where the rationale of selection changes to meet differing 
priorities of the organisation over time. For example, a club signing an athlete at 
the beginning of the season may be clearly focused on using that player to help 
win the competition. If, however, towards the end of the competition it becomes 
clear  that the team will not make the semi-finals, the rationale behind making a 
selection  may,  for  example,  change  to that  of  deliberately  losing  matches  to 
improve draft choices for the following season- this new purpose is irrelevant to 
the intention of the parties at the time of contract formation. 
 
Subjective selection and implication through  construction 
 
Although  not likely to have resulted in a different outcome,  the case of Farrell 
may well have been argued as a matter of contract construction. Contract 
construction  requires the court to interpret the linguistic  meaning of terms used 
within  the contact  and/or  the legal effect of  those  terms  to, perhaps,  reveal a 
breach of contract.40  In essence the task of the court is, by objective reference to 
the express  words of the contract, to give the term in question  the construction 
the parties intended.41  The terms governing selection create legal rights and 
obligations   and  where  wrongly  constructed   those  rights  and  obligations  are 
obviated.  In  the context  of selection,  an  athlete  aggrieved  at  his or  her non- 
selection will propose that selectors did not give the term governing selection the 
construction intended by the parties. 
 
When the word "selection"  appears in a sporting contract the natural question to 
ask is what the word means in the context of this sport, and what is its scope of 
operation?  Does  the word "selection",  for  example,  contractually  empower  a 
selector to make an unfettered decision ignoring the relative merits of contending 
athletes?  In this sense the word "selection"  may  have a particular  meaning or 
legal  effect  beyond  the  literal  meaning  of  the  word  itself.  Discerning   the 
intention of the parties requires that the court "place itself in thought in the same 
factual matrix" as that of the parties when the contract  was formed.42  Where the 




39  BP Refinery  (Westernport) Pty Ltd v Shire of Hastings  (1977) 180 CLR 266. 
40 Life Insurance Co of Australia Ltd v Phillips (1925) 36 CLR 60. 
41 Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
42 Reardon  Smith Line lld v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976]  I WLR 989 at 997 per Wilberforce  U. 
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To determine the meaning or effect of a term, the context (factual matrix or 
surrounding  circumstances)  is all important.  As stated by Lord Wilberforce  in 
Prenn v Simmonds: 
 
"In order for the agreement ... to be understood, it must be placed in 
its context. The time has  long  passed when agreements,  even those 
under seal, were isolated from the matrix of facts in which they were 
set and interpreted purely on linguistic considerations. ... We must ... 
inquire beyond  the language  and see what the circumstances  were 
with  reference   to  which  the  words  were  used,  and  the  object, 
appearing  from  those  circumstances,  which  the  person  using  them 
had in view. . Moreover ...  it has been clear enough that evidence of 
mutually  known  facts may be admitted  to identify  the meaning  of a 
descriptive term."43 
 
"...   evidence   should   be   restricted   to   evidence   of   the   factual 
background known to the parties at or before the date of the contract, 
including evidence of the "genesis" and objectively the "aim"  of the 
transaction."44 
 
The High Court stated, in Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphaphann  Pty Ltd: 
 
"The meaning of tenns of a contractual document is to be determined 
by what a reasonable  person would have tmderstood'them to mean. 
That, normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of 
the surrounding circumstances  known to the parties, and the purpose 
and object of the transaction. "45 
 
Similarly,  in Pacific Carriers  Limited v BNP Paribus, a case concerning  letters 
of indemnity, the High Court said: 
 
"The  construction  of the letters of indemnity  is to be determined  by 
what  a  reasonable  person  in  the  position  of  Pacific  would  have 
understood them to mean. That requires consideration, not only of the 
text of the documents, but also the surrounding circumstances  known 
to Pacific and BNP, and the purpose and object of the transaction. "46 
 






43  Prenn vSimmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381  at 1383. 
44  Prenn vSimmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 at 1385. 
45  Toll (FGCn Pty Ltd v Alphaphann PtyLtd [2004] HCA 52 at [41]. 
46  Pacific Carriers Limited  v BNP Paribus  [2004] HCA 35 at [22]. 




"The  inquiry is objective: The question is what a reasonable person, 
circumstanced as the actual parties were, would have understood the 
parties to have meant by the use of the specific language. The answer 
to that question is to be gathered  from the text under consideration 
and its relevant contextual sense.   7 
 
In respect to linguistic meaning, Carter and Peden comment: 
 
"...linguistic meaning  refers to the meaning which would be placed 
on the words of a contract  according  to the applicable  standard of 
interpretation  (it  is assumed  due  account  is taken  of context).  The 
standard of interpretation may be that of the community at large, that 
of  a  defined  portion  of  the  community  (for  example,  those  in  a 
particular  trade)  or  the  parties  themselves  (where  the  meaning  is 
unique).  Linguistic   meaning   cannot   be  determined   without   first 
establishing the applicable standard of interpretation. "48 
 
In regard to this comment it is suggested here that the linguistic meaning to be 
given to the word "selection" is best determined in reference to "the parties 
themselves where the meaning is unique". Sport as a "community" or "trade" 
would appear inapplicable as a "defined community" in the sense referred to by 
Carter and Peden in evaluating the linguistic meaning of "selection" - given the 
variation in selection norms across sport in general there can be no inclusive 
community. 49 
 
The fact that the applicable intention is that of "a reasonable person in the 
position of the parties" indicates that construction may be referenced more 
narrowly than the reasonable person on the "omnibus", to focus upon, in this 
case, the reasonable person within the sport in question. The point being made is 
that "sport" possesses mores and customs different to other forms of industry. 
These mores form part of the factual matrix the court must come to terms with in 
discerning the meaning and legal effect of the word "selection". There may, for 
example, be some recourse to matters of "fairness" not likely to feature in 
argument in more traditional industries. 
 
The surrounding circumstances bearing upon the construction of terms of 
selection, of course, depends upon the sport in question and the particular event 
for which an athlete is contending. Grand-finals are obviously different to pre- 
season games. Events of great prestige such as  world championships or  the 
Olympics are different to club matches. One-off events differ to matches played 
 
 
47  Sirius International Insurance v FAI General Insurance [2005] 1 ALLER 191 at 200. 
48  JW Carter and Elisabeth Peden 'The "Natural Meaning" of Contracts' (2005) 21 JCL 277. 
49  In some sports an argument may be put that the term 'selection'  has a customary use. To do so 
requires the athlete to produce evidence that the custom was 'well known, notorious, reasonable and 
certain' Asset  Insure Pty Ltd v New Cap Reinsurance  Corp Ltd (inliq) (2006) 225 CLR 331 at 353. 
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each week. Remuneration  and the level of remuneration  are likely to feature as 
circumstances  bearing  upon  intention  and construction.  The  need  for  national 
teams to be viable over long time periods will predictably require more 
experienced players to make way for developing players. The possibilities are 
naturally  wide. Nevertheless, the overriding argument  in any professional  sport 
or where athletes contend for a prestigious event will be that the intention of the 
parties was to select according to relative merit. 
 
 
Subjective selection and the exercise of discretion 
 
A subjective  selection  regime  involves selectors  in  the exercise  of discretion. 
Where  contracts   of  selection   are  concerned,   it  is  suggested   here  that  this 
discretion  can  only  be exercised  "honestly".  That  is,  the selector  is  required, 
under the implied terms of the contract to give an honest appraisal of the relative 
merits of the athletes vying for selection. It goes without saying, therefore, that 
any selection made with an ulterior motive is done so in breach of contract. 
 
Consider  the comparisons  within  the case of  Meehan  v  Jones.50  The  vendors 
agreed to sell land in Queensland on which an oil refinery  had been built. The 
purchaser  was protected by a "subject  to finance" clause enabling  him to avoid 
the contract  if he was  unable to secure  finance  satisfactory  to his needs. The 
pertinent clause read: 
 
"The  Purchaser or his nominee receiving approval for finance on 
satisfactory terms and conditions in an amount sufficient to complete 
the purchase." 
 
Satisfactory   finance  was,  in  fact,  secured  by  the  purchasers.  The  vendors, 
however, apparently changing their minds, attempted to void the contract on the 
grounds  of  uncertainty  in  that  the  subject  to  finance  clause  left  "...  to  the 
discretion  of the purchaser  whether  he will perform  the obligations  which the 
contract purports to describe, so that what appears to be a contract is really 
illusory".51 That is, the discretion  removed from the purchaser any obligation to 
perform, resulting in a "non-contract". The High Court found the clause was not 
illusory. Our interest, though, is with the High Court's  view of the obligations 
attaching  to the purchaser's exercise of the discretion  and any legal constraints 
which may be placed upon parties charged with exercising a discretion in a wider 
sense. 
 
Gibbs CJ stated in respect of determining  whether the subject to finance clause 




50 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571. 
51 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 at [7]. 
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"No  doubt it may be implied  that the purchaser will act honestly in 
deciding whether or not he is satisfied."52 
 
Similarly, Mason J expressed the view: 
 
"The  primary  object  of  the  condition  being  the  protection  of  the 
purchaser, it is sensible  to treat it as stipulating  for finance that is 
satisfactory  to the  purchaser  or his nominee,  subject  to an implied 
obligation  that he will act honestly,  or honestly  and reasonably,  in 
endeavouring to obtain finance and in deciding whether to accept or 
reject proposals for finance. "53 
 
The judgment of the purchaser as to what constitutes finance on 
satisfactory terms ... must be reached honestly or honestly and 
reasonably. "54 
 
Wilson J commented: 
 
"... subject always to the construction of the contract in a particular 
case, the court will imply no greater obligation on the purchaser than 
that he is obliged to act honestly in determining whether the available 
finance  is  satisfactory.  ...  The  requirement  of  an  honest  judgment 
may be thought to  provide the vendor with the maximum  protection 
which is available under the clause."55 
 
The majority of the Court recognised that in exercising the discretion, one 
existing for the benefit of the purchaser, the decision-maker must do so 
"honestly".56   Does, however, the principle espoused in Meehan  v  Jones, one 
relating to the exercise of a discretion as to the suitability of finance, have a 
broader application? Much depends on the juridical basis for holding that such 
an option should be exercised honestly. 
 
Honesty as an implication 
 
From the passages above it is quite clear that the High Court's ruling is one 
grounded on implication. To repeat the words of Gibbs CJ: 
 
"No doubt it may be implied that the purchaser will act honestly in 
deciding whether or not he is satisfied. However, it does not seem to 
me necessary, in order to give business efficacy to a contract, that a 
 
 
52 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Gibbs CJ at [11]. 
53 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Mason 1 at [18]. 
54 Meehm1 v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Mason J at [22]. 
55 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Wilson J at [2]. See further discussion  below. 
56  Murphy J indicating  the exercise of the discretion  was entirely a matter for the purchaser. 
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condition should  be implied  that the purchaser will make  reasonable 
efforts  to obtain  finance. "57 
 
The  second  sentence  of  the passage is important  because  it indicates  that his 
Honour's reasoning  as regards implication  is based on the notion of "business 
efficacy". It may equally be argued that the parties would have intended such an 
application  "as  being so obvious  that it goes  without saying"  had they turned 
their minds to the question of how the subject to finance clause should operate. 
 
Mason J also based  his judgment on an obligation  arising  through implication 
and additionally introduced, but did not elaborate on, an obligation related to the 
"legitimate expectations" of the other party: 
 
"To   say  that  a  "subject   to  finance"  or  "subject   to  finance  on 
satisfactory  terms  and  conditions"  clause  denotes  finance  which  is 
satisfactory  to the purchaser is not to say that he has an unfettered 
right to decide  what is satisfactory. To concede  such a right would 
certainly serve the object of the clause in protecting him. But it would 
do  so at the legitimate  expectations  of the  vendor  by enabling  the 
purchaser to escape from the contract on a mere declaration that he 
could not obtain suitable finance. With some justification the vendor 
can claim that the agreement made by the parties is not an option but 
a  binding  contract  which  relieves the  purchaser  from  performance 
only in the event that, acting honestly, or honestly and reasonably, he 
is unable to obtain suitable finance. "58 
 
So then, the juridical basis for the Court determining  that the discretion is to be 
applied honestly is that of implication. The fact that the purpose of the discretion 
was  for  the  benefit  of  the purchaser  did  not expunge  the  requirement  of  the 
discretion   to  be  applied  with  an  honest  appraisal   of  its  suitability   to  the 
purchaser.  Arguably, a fortiori, this applies where an honest appraisal  is to the 
benefit of the other party. 
 
There  is  no  practical  reason  to  extensively  discuss  whether  the  parties  to  a 
sporting  contract  intend  the exercise  of  a  discretion  in selection  to  be  made 
honestly or dishonestly. To argue other than an honest appraisal is to suggest the 
parties would, had their minds turned to the subject, have intended selections to 
be made dishonestly. The requirement of honesty as a matter of implication, in 
such circumstances, speaks for itself. Of course, the argument of honest appraisal 
is discussed  in  reference  to  the relative  merit  of  contending  athletes.  Where, 
however, merit is not the intended object of selection, honesty as to "merit" will 
not  apply. Nevertheless,  wherever a selection  is  made  to  achieve  a particular 
 
 
57 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Gibbs CJ at [II]. 
58 Meehan v Jones and Ors (1982) 149 CLR 571 per Mason J at [22]. 
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purpose the selectors must be honest in attempting to meet that purpose. For 
example,  where the purpose is to blood youngsters for the future, the selectors 
must act honestly in selecting those youngsters with the best chance of 
performing well in the future. 
 
It is worth noting that Mason and Wilson JJ in Meehan v Jones also made 
reference to whether the discretion, through implication, should be exercised 
"reasonably". What is "reasonable" of course suggests an objective standard for 
determining how the discretion is to be exercised.59  In contracts dealing with 
subjective selection, such an implication conflicts with the selectors express 
capacity to use their expert and subjective judgment as to merit and cannot, 
without more, be incorporated as a term.60 
 
 
Subjective selection and the contractual obligation of good faith 
 
Although selectors are entitled to base decisions on their subjective belief, it is 
suggested here that this entitlement is fettered by an obligation to act in good 
faith. That is, in exercising its contractual rights, the organisation or its selectors 
must permit the other party, the athlete, to access the benefits of the contract. 61 In 
short, the "obligation of good faith and reasonableness in the performance of a 
contractual obligation or the exercise of a contractual power may be implied as a 
matter of law as a legal incident of a commercial contract"62 or may be found as 
an implication arising from the express contractual terms.63 Note, however, that 
the implied obligation of good faith performance may be expressly excluded 64 
and further, there is no "duty to subordinate self-interest entirely which is the lot 
of the fiduciary".65 
 
 
The status of good faith in contract 
 
Although yet to be fully accepted as a cause of action the High Court by majority 
in Royal  Botanic  Gardens  v South  Sydney  City Council  acknowledged "good 
faith" as a live issue stating, "... whilst the issues respecting the existence and 
scope of a "good faith" doctrine are important, this is an inappropriate occasion 
to  consider them".66   There  is,  nevertheless, substantial reference, or  indeed 
 
 
59 See later discussion  of reasonableness in 'Subjective selections  and objective unreasonableness'. 
6° Codelfa Constructions Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337. 
61 Burger  King Corp  v Hungry  Jacks Pty Ltd [2001]  NSWCA 187; Far Horizons  Pty v McDonald's 
Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310; Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004]  NSWCA 15. 
62  Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004]  NSWCA 15 at [125]. There is no attempt in 
this paper to discuss  whether good faith should be implied as a matter of law to all sporting contracts. 
63 Farrell v Royal King's Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51 at [69] BC200601478. 
64 Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations  Ltd [2004]  NSWCA 15. 
65 Overlook  v Foxtel [2002]  NSWSC 17 at 67 referencing Burger King Corp v Hungry  Jacks Pty Ltd 
[2001]  NSWCA 187. 
66  Royal  Botanic  Gardens  and Domain Trust  v South  Sydney  City Council  (2002)  186  ALR 289 at 
[40] and [156]. Kirby J dissenting. 
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acceptance, of a doctrine of good faith in several Australian jurisdictions. In 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister of Public Works where Priestley 
JA stated: 
 
"People   generally,  including  judges  and  other  lawyers,  from  all 
strands  of the community,  have  grown  used to the  courts applying 
standards of fairness to contract which are wholly consistent with the 
existence  in all contracts of a duty on the parties of good faith and 
fair dealing in its peiformance.  In my view this is in these days the 
expected   standard,   and  anything   less   is  contrary   to   prevailing 
community expectations." 61 
 
In Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonalds Australia Ltd, Byrne J commented: 
 
"/do not see myself at liberty to depart from the considerable body of 
authority  in this country  which  has  followed  decisions  of the  New 
South Wales Court of Appeal in Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v 
Minister  for  Public  Works.  I  proceed,  therefore,  on  the basis  that 
there is to be implied into a franchise agreement a tenn of good faith 
and  fair dealing  which  obliges  each  party to  exercise  the  powers 
conferred  on it by the agreement  in good faith and reasonably, and 
not  capriciously  or for some extraneous  purpose.  Such a term  is a 
legal incident of such a contract."68 
 
Finkelstein J expressed similar sentiments in Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd 
v Subaru (Australia) Pty Ltd: 
 
"Recent  cases make  it clear that in appropriate  contracts,  perhaps 
even  in  all  commercial  contracts,  such  a  term  will  ordinarily  be 
implied;  not as an ad hoc term (based  on the presumed intention of 
the parties) but as a legal incident  of the  relationship ...  If such a 
term is implied it will require a contracting  party to act in good faith 
and fairly, not only in relation to the performance of a contractual 











67  Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ud  v Minister of Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 268. 
68  Far Horizons Pty Ud  v McDonalds Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [120]. 
69  Garry Rogers Motors Aust Pty Ltd v Subaru  (Australia) Pty Ltd (1999)  ATPR 41-703 at 43,014. 
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What is "good faith"? 
 
There are three generally accepted strands to the obligation of "good  faith" with 
some overlap between these strands. In Vodafone  Pacific v Mobile Innovations 
Ltd 10 Giles J observed that: 
 
"There  is  a  regrettable  lack  of  uniformity  in  the  cases. 
Reasonableness  can be seen as part of good faith, and acting in bad 
faith is hardly reasonable. The difficulty in arriving at the content of 
an obligation of good faith, in particular, has often been noted ..." 
 
"Good  faith meaning honesty and good faith meaning doing what is 
necessary to enable the party to have the benefit of the contract were 
two elements of the implied obligation taken by the (trial) judge. They 
are really different. Perhaps different again is good faith meaning 
reasonableness." 
 





•  Reasonableness; 
 




The obligation of honesty 
 
"Honesty" in  the context  of  Meehan  v  Jones  required  that  the  holder  of  the 
discretion  in relation to a "subject  to finance" clause  take an honest view as to 
whether available finance suited his or her needs.72  Whilst honesty in respect of 
good  faith  incorporates  the  same obligation  as  that  in  Meehan  v  Jones  it  is 
arguable that honesty in respect of good faith in sporting selections  will operate 
more extensively  to include the absence of personal  bias and the avoidance of 
ulterior purposes. 
 
Honesty and purpose 
 
Subjective  honesty in sports  selection requires  merely that the selector  give an 
honest appraisal  to the relative worth of contending athletes  with respect  to the 
 
 
70  Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA 15 at [193]. 
71 The argument has been made that the obligation of reasonableness and allowing the other party to 
benefit from the contract, may be nothing more than sub-sets of honesty. See Burger King Corp v 
Hungry Jacks [2001] NSWCA 187 at [169-170]. 
72  See above. 
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needs of the team. This obligation, of course, extends to avoiding personal and 
ulterior motives or bias. 
 
The  obligation  also  extends  to  the  avoidance  of  specious  justifications   for 
selections  that are not otherwise  warranted.  As Barrett  J stated  in Overlook  v 
Foxtel: 
 
"A party is precluded from cynical resort to black letter."73 
 
Similarly,  Windeyer  J in Mangrove  Mountain  Quarries  v Barlow  commented 
that the plaintiff could not pretend: 
 
"...to rely upon breaches of no importance to him or her to achieve  a 
collateral result ... "74 
 
In this sense a selector who, in seeking to achieve a collateral purpose promotes 
matters that are of no true relevance to the selection, will breach the obligation to 
select honestly. 
 
In Far Horizons v McDonalds Byrne J stated: 
 
"... good faith and fair dealing ...  obliges each party to exercise the 
powers  conferred   upon  it  by  the  agreement   in  good  faith  and 
reasonably,  and not  capriciously  or  for some  extraneous  purpose. 
Such a term is a legal incident of such a contract." 15 
 
As Byrne J stated, a decision made to achieve an extraneous purpose is not made 
in good faith. It is suggested that the purpose to be achieved in making selections 
is  a  fundamental   guide  as  to  whether  the  selection   is  made  honestly.  For 
example, a selection that seeks to achieve an extraneous purpose cannot be made 
honestly - an extraneous purpose, by definition, furthers a different purpose from 
that of the term of selection. 
 
The "purpose"  behind a selection process was discussed previously in the cases 
of  Farrell  v Royal  King's  Park Tennis  Club/ 6   and  Zusman  v  Royal  Western 
Australian  Bowling  Association.77  Such cases may also illustrate  the notion  of 
"good  faith" honesty. Where  the intended  purpose of the contract is to provide 
social  enjoyment  there  can  be  no breach  of  the honesty  strand  of good  faith 
should   the  selectors   ignore   the  relative   merit  of   the  contending   athletes. 
 
 
73 Overlook v Foxtef [2002] NSWSC 17at [67]. 
74  Mangrove Mountain  Quanies Pty Ltd v Barlow [2007] SCNSW 492 at [28]. 
75 Far Horizons  Pty Ltd v McDonald's Australia  Ltd [2000]  VSC 310 at [159]; see also Burger  King 
Corp v Hungry Jacks [2001] NSWCA  187. 
76  Farrell v Royal King's  Park Tennis Club (Inc) [2006] WASC 51. 
77  Zusman  v Royal Western Australian  Bowling Association (Inc) [1999] WASC 86. 
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Conversely,  as in Zusman, where selection  is made  to field  a State  team  that 
selection  must, to meet  the implied  purpose  of  winning,  be based  on relative 
merit and, where done so, there can be no dishonesty. 
 
Athlete  selections,  however,  are  not always  made  for  the primary  purpose  of 
winning.  Where  winning  is  not  the  prime  objective  of  selection,  a  different 
analysis logically applies. 
 
For  example,  in  Daley  v  NSW  Rugby  League  Ltd  witness  evidence  was  put 
before the court that: 
 
"The  Australian Selectors do select teams primarily on the basis of 
current form. However, there are a number of other considerations. 
For example, I recall that in 1994 the inform hooker in the State of 
Origin Series was Benny Elias and, on form he was recognised by the 
selectors  to  be  entitled  to  be  the  shadow  hooker  for  the  1994 
Kangaroo Tour behind Steve Walters. The selectors decided that, as 
Elias was to retire at the end of the season, a younger player with 
promise should be given the opportunity and commence obtaining the 
experience required at international levels. "78 
 
Where  such  a  policy  applies,  the  appraisal,  nonetheless,  of  who  should  be 
excluded and who should be promoted must be done honestly and with a view to 
achieving the intended purpose of the selection. 
 
Honesty may also require selectors to give a true weighting to the various criteria 
governing  selection or, to paraphrase  the comment  of Windeyer J in Mangrove 
Mountain  Quarries v Barlow, not "to rely upon 'weightings' of no importance to 
him  or  her  to  achieve  a  collateral  result  ...".79   In  Zusman  v  Royal  Western 
Australian   Bowling  Association 80    State  selectors   were  required  to  take  into 
account a range of criteria, some of which did not focus on athletic performance, 
including  a "player's personal image, compatibility  as well as what he portrays 
as  a  member  of  a  pennant  side  or  state  side,  concentration,   temperament, 
behaviour,  ambition  and  team  spirit".  How  for  example,  should  a  player's 
"personal  image" be weighted alongside sporting prowess? It may be suggested 
that should "image"  be disproportionately  applied,  the selection  is in breach of 
contract notwithstanding that "image" is an express criteria. 
 
Even   where  the  purpose   of  selection   necessitates   a  merit  appraisal   there 
nevertheless remains significant scope for selectors to take a personal view as to 
criteria indicative of merit. Again, the selector engaged in a subjective selection 
 
 
78  Daley v NSW Rugby League l.Jd [1995] NSWIRC 183 affidavit  of Don Furner. 
79  Mangrove Mountain  Quarries Pty Ltd v Barlow [2007] SCNSW 492 at [28]. 
80  Zusman  v Royal Western  Australian  Bowling Association  (Inc) [1999] WASC 86. 
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is permitted as a matter of contract to apply his or her opinion  to the selection 
process. It may be suggested  that provided the selection, for better or worse, is 
made with the purpose of benefiting the team there is no contractual dishonesty. 
For an athlete aggrieved at non-selection there remains a practical difficulty of 
proving that a selection was not made honestly - in most instances an extraneous 
purpose   will  not  be  known   to  a  complainant   athlete.  Nevertheless,   where 
dishonesty  can  be  discerned   the  matter  is  actionable  in  breach  of  contract. 
Although  referring to a  matter of  misrepresentation consider the dictum of 
Bowen LJ in Edgington v Fitzmaurice: 
 
"...a state of a  man's  mind  is as  much  a  fact as  the  state of  his 
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a 
man's mind at a particular time is, but if it can'be ascertained,  it is as 
much a fact as anything else. A misrepresentation as to the state of a 
man's mind at a particular time, if it can be ascertained, is as much a 
fact as anything  else. A misrepresentation  as to the  state of man's 
mind is a misstatement offact" 81• 
 
A selection  made dishonestly,  with ulterior purpose or with bias is a matter of 
fact. Ascertaining  this fact, in the words of Bowen U is "difficult",  nevertheless 
where provable an action in breach of contract is available. 
 
 
Subjective selections and objective unreasonableness 
 
There  is some doubt  as to the meaning of "reasonableness" in respect of good 
faith, a doubt which apparently prompted Meagher JAin Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v 
Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney to state in 
respect of the word, "whatever  that means".82  There is also debate as to whether 
"reasonableness" is an independent  obligation  or is a subset  of  honestl3   and 
further, whether good faith is implied as a matter of law or of fact.84  The words, 
"reasonable" "arbitrary" and "capricious"  are often used to describe breaches of 
the implied contractual obligation of reasonableness. Such descriptors,  however, 
are  somewhat   problematic   when  used  in  respect  of  good  faith  in  sporting 
selections. It is difficult to conceive of such words being applied other than 
objectively  - the words themselves suggest, to some extent, a variation from an 
objective  norm. In  fact, subjective  sporting selections  are  very  likely  to be at 
variance with objective standards. This is especially the case where the selector- 
 
81 Edgington v Fitvnaurice (1885) 29 Ch D481 at483. 
g 2  Hughes Bros Pty Ltd v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Archdiocese of Sydney 
(1993) 31  NSWLR 91  at 91; see also Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public 
Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 236-37. 
83 Burger King Corp v Hungry Jacks [2001] NSWCA 187 see [141]-[142], [158], [169]; Francis v 
South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ud  [2002] FCA 1306 at [203]; Garry Rogers 
Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru (Aust) Pty Ltd (1999) ATPR 41-703. 
84 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 236; 
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jacks [2001] NSWCA 187 at [164]. 




coach, in a "creative" or "inspired"  moment, believes a particular player or 
combination of players is likely to benefit the team. Selections by  their very 
nature  are  sometimes  made  whimsically,  on  a  hunch  or  as  a  gamble. These 
"inspired" selections are not the product of mathematical certainty and, as is well 
known, do not always achieve the desired result - but are nonetheless 
contractually permissible under a subjective methodology. Indeed, in the absence 
of stated criteria, an objectively certain standard by which to gauge the 
reasonableness of a selection is illusory; everyone has their opinion and, 
particularly in sport, there are varying degrees of umeasonableness. 
 
Where  a  selection  is,  on  an  objective  standard,  unreasonable,  an  aggrieved 
athlete  will,  it  may  be  suggested,  have  little  recourse  to  contract  law.  The 
application  of a contractual  term is a matter of the parties'  intention  discerned 
from the contract and surrounding  circumstances  such that, where the intention 
of  the  parties  is  to  permit  objectively  unreasonable  conduct  on  the  part  of 
selectors,  there can  be no complaint.  In  Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald's 
Australia Ltd it was said: "... that whether a party is at liberty to do an act whose 
consequence  is to disentitle  the other party from a contractual  benefit, must be 
determined  from  the  intention  of  the  parties  as  manifested  by  the  contract 
itself."85 
 
The parties to such contractual  tenns must be taken to have intended the words 
"subjective selection" to permit selectors to draw upon their personal view to, 
perhaps, select team members that the objectively  reasonable  person would not. 
Again,  it is  not the arbitrariness  or  unreasonableness  of  the selection  that the 
athlete  contractually  questions  - it  is  whether  the  arbitrary  or  unreasonable 
selection is made honestly for the perceived benefit of the team. 
 
Although a subjective selection may, in an objective sense, be legitimately 
unreasonable there are, nonetheless, good faith limits imposed on the power to 
exercise such a discretion "unreasonably". It may be suggested that as a matter of 
contract,  a selector  must turn  his or her  mind to the relative capacities  of  the 
athletes vying for selection. Once this is done the selection, provided it is honest, 
is unassailable. The case of Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for 
Public Works 86   arguably  illustrates  the  point  that,  whilst  a selector  may  be 
entitled  to select "unreasonably", he or she is obliged  to at least consider  the 
merits of contenders. In the context of a construction contract the plaintiff agreed 
to build part of a sewerage plant. The Minister for Public works was permitted, 
under the contract, to take over the project and terminate the contract if Renard 
defaulted in performance.  However,  prior to exercising  this right, the Minister 
was required to allow Renard to "show cause" why the right to terminate should 
 
85  Far Horizons Pty Ltd v McDonald's  Australia Ltd [2000] VSC 310 at [128] quoting directly: 
Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 607-8 
per Mason J. 
H  Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234. 
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not be so exercised.  As it transpired Renard fell behind and was called upon to 
"show cause". 
 
Renard offered a number of reasons why the contract should not be terminated, 
including  the Minister's failure  to supply to Renard  parts required  to complete 
certain  stages  of the work, the fact that Renard  had increased  its workforce  to 
catch   up,  that  longer  hours  were  being  worked  and  that  a  new  and  more 
experienced foreman had been appointed. This information was not passed to the 
official empowered  to terminate contracts on the Minister's behalf. Upon 
tennination  Renard claimed the Minister had wrongfully repudiated the contract. 
Priestley JA observed: 
 
"It seems to me that an objective outsider on reading (the show cause 
clause)   would   assume   that   the   principal   would   have   to   give 
reasonable  consideration  to  whether  the  contractor  had  failed  to 
show cause and to whether any power should be exercised ... "87 
 
Priestley  JA found  the Minister  was obliged  to give bona fide, proper and due 
consideration to the Renard's  submissions. Handley JA commented: 
 
"The  power is exercisable  for "cause" and after the contractor  has 
been given an opportunity to be heard. The notion of showing cause 
seems inconsistent  with the view that the principle will be entitled to 
act, within the limits of honesty, on his own idiosyncratic opinion."88 
 
The  Minister  was required  to  give  reasonable  consideration   to  the  merits of 
Renard's   argument.  After  doing  so  the  Minister  was  required  to  base  any 
decision  to terminate on the inadequacy  of those arguments  rather than on "his 
own idiosyncratic  opinion". A selector on the other hand is permitted  to apply 
his or  her  "idiosyncratic  opinion"  to any  selection  - provided  that opinion  is 
honestly held. Nevertheless, a common obligation remains -selectors must bring 
their minds to bear upon the matter in question and in so doing allow the other 
party to avail itself of the contractual right to have its "case" considered. To draw 
the obvious conclusion  in respect of sports selections, the contract pre-supposes, 
intends, that the selector  will consider the athlete for a position within the team 
vis-a-vis other athletes. Where this is done, the selector is then free to make any 
decision he or she honestly believes to be in the interests of the sport. 
 
It may be suggested  that, rather than seeking to impugn the reasonableness  of a 
selection, complaining athletes would be better served to propose that an 
unreasonable  selection  was so perverse that the selectors  had not brought  their 
minds to bear upon the task at all. That is, the implied obligation  to consider and 
 
 
87 Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 257. 
88  Renard  Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234 at 279 
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weigh the merits of contending  athletes  was completely  abandoned.  In Paton v 
Sydney  Press  Club  Jordan CJ noted in respect of the decision of a domestic 
tribunal: 
 
"...unreasonable becomes  relevant only  where the  reason which  it 
states for its opinion can be regarded as so obviously absurd that it 
may be inferred that it was not really an opinion at all."89 
 
Again, of course, access to the reasons for a particular selection may be difficult 
to come by. Nevertheless where these can be ascertained or where a selection 
bypasses all rationality the athlete may have an arguable case. 
 
 
Allowing the other party to have the benefit of the contract 
 
This third strand of contractual good faith is concerned with situations where one 
party obstructs the other party in accessing, in whole or in part, the benefits it is 
entitled to under the contract. Often the denying party must perform some act or 
service  before the other party is able to access  a contractual  benefit or fails to 
turn its mind to a matter it is contractually  obliged  to consider. In Overlook  v 
Foxtel Barrett J summarised this implied obligation in these terms: 
 
"... no party is fixed with the duty to subordinate self-interest entirely 
which is the lot of the fiduciary. The duty is not a duty to prefer the 
interests  of  the  other  contracting   party.  It  is,  rather,  a  duty  to 
recognise and to have due regard to the legitimate interests of both 
the parties in the enjoyment of the fruits of the contract as delineated 
by its terms."90 
 
Finkelstein J in Garry Rogers Motors v Subaru put the obligation as one where 
the court would not permit a term to "operate so as to restrict actions designed to 
promote the legitimate interests of that (other) party".91 
 
The High Court in Peters (WA)  Ltd v Petersville  Ltd more forcefully  stated in 
respect of the related obligation of co-operation: 
 
"The  law already  implies an obligation by the respondents to do all 
things  as are  necessary  on their  part to  enable (the  appellants)  to 
have the benefit (of the contract). ... The law also implies a negative 
covenant not to hinder or prevent the fulfilment of the purpose of ... 




90  Overlook v Foxrel [2002]  NSWSC 17at [67]. 
91 Garry Rogers Motors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Subaru  (Aust) Pty Ud (1999) ATPR 41-703 at [182]. 
92 Peters (WA) Ud  v Petersville  Ltd (2001) 205 CLR 126 at 142. 
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In matters of selection, the contractual right of an athlete to be selected, or indeed 
to be considered for selection, depends on the organisation or selectors acting in 
good faith and not unfairly depriving the athlete of that right. Where selectors do 
not take the athlete into consideration,  make determinations  for ulterior purposes 
or actively prevent the athlete from gaining a benefit he or she is otherwise 
entitled to, the "obligation of access" is breached. Take, for example, the 
contractual terms faced by rugby league player Kirk Reynoldson discussed in the 
introduction.  Reynoldson  was entitled to a further league playing contract when 
he  played  his  15th  game  for  the  Newcastle  Club.  His  access  to  this  benefit 
depended  upon the actions of the Club - he could do nothing other than play to 
the best of his ability and rely on the selectors performing their contractual 
obligations  in good faith. Where a club in such  a position detennines,  for any 
reason  other  than  merit,93   it  will  not select  the player,  it  denies  the player  a 
legitimate interest and is in breach of the contract. 
 
Consider  the illustrative  case  of Burger  King Corp  v Hungry  Jack's.94   In  the 
1970s  Hungry Jack's  (HJPL)  entered  a franchise  agreement  with Burger  King 
Corporation  (BKC), the second  largest  fast food  business  in the world behind 
McDonalds. By 1990 HJPL operated 148 restaurants in Australia. trading under 
the name of Hungry Jack's. Disputation arose between the firms in the 1990s and 
ultimately resulted in BKC contracting  with Shell to use Shell service stations as 
BKC  outlets.  It  became  clear  that  BKC  wanted  HJPL  out  of  the franchise. 
HJPL's right to sell BKC products was governed  by a Development  Agreement 
entered into in 1990. This agreement required HJPL to open four new restaurants 
a year throughout parts of Australia. The procedure to open a restaurant required 
under the contract that, "Hungry  Jack's must apply for and obtain franchise and 
site approval  from BKC  for each  restaurant  to be established  pursuant to this 
agreement  through BKC's  standard  franchise and site approval procedures". In 
other  words HJPL's  could  not open a restaurant  unless BKC gave, at its sole 
discretion,  approval- including  financial status approval. In 1995 BKC ceased 
granting  franchise  and site approval  and  in consequence  HJPL  was unable  to 
open  the  obligatory  four  restaurants  a  year.  As  a  result  of  this  failure  BKC 
tenninated  the franchise  agreement  and, in addition,  placed  a freeze on HJPL 
establishing  third  party  franchisees  - a  previously  enjoyed  entitlement.  HJPL 
claimed  damages  in breach of contract  for tl.te loss of the opportunity  to open 
restaurants. 
 
The Court of Appeal considered good faith in respect of extraneous purpose and 






93  Except of course where other contractual rationaJes govern selection. 
94  Burger King Corporation  v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001]  NSWCA  187. 
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ways   to  reduce   HJPL's   role  if  it  could  not  remove   it  from   the  market 
altogether".95 The Court stated: 
 
"... BKC's  contractual  powers under (the relevant clause)  are to be 
exercised in good faith and reasonably. That does not mean that BKC 
is  not  entitled  to  have  regards  to  its  own  legitimate  interests  in 
exercising  its discretion.  However, it must not do so for a  purpose 
extraneous to the contract- for example, by withholding financial or 
operational  approval where there is no basis to do so, so as to thwart 
HJPL's  rights under the contract." 
 
The Court  noted that all financial criteria  necessary  for financial  approval  had 
been satisfied such that: 
 
"BKC' s  failure  to  grant  financial  approval  after  it  has  assessed 
HJPL  as  having  complied  with  its  (criteria)  was  a  breach  of  the 
implied term of good faith." 
 
BKC's  conduct in not granting financial approval to HJPL: 
 
"...   is  properly   characterised   as  directed   not  to  furthering   its 
legitimate  rights under the Development Agreement but to preventing 
HJPL  from  performing  its obligations  under the development 
Agreement. As Rolfe J put it: 'it was in pursuance of a deliberate plan 
to  prevent  HJPL  expanding,  and  to  enable  BKC  to  develop  the 
Australian  market  unhindered  by its contractual arrangements  with 
HJPL.' We agree with this conclusion. "96 
 
The Court further noted in respect of operational approval that: 
 
"We  are also of the opinion the BKC's  conduct  in disapproving,  in 
the  manner   and  at  the  time  it  did,  was  breach  of  the  implied 
obligation of co-operation. It was apparent that the Expansion Policy 
required performance by both parties to achieve its purpose."97 
 
At its discretion  BKC possessed an express contractual  right to approve  or not 
approve HJPL's new restaurants. Emerging from the judgment is the proposition 
that the exercise of a discretion is not unfettered and must not be used as a ploy 
or device to bring about an extraneous purpose. More simply, the intention of the 
parties was not to permit such a term, a term the purpose of which was to ensure 
 
 
95 Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 at [223]. 
96  Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 at [309]. Reference to trial 
judge Rolfe J. 
97 Burger King Corporation v Hungry Jack's Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 187 at [369]. 
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franchise standards were maintained, to be used as a mechanism to remove a 
franchisee who in fact maintains the required standard. 
 
In  Hughes  Aircraft  Systems  International   v  Airservices   Australia,98    Hughes 
tendered unsuccessfully to provide an air traffic control system for the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA). A Tender Evaluation Committee had recommended 
Hughes to the CAA Board who twice, nonetheless, rejected Hughes. Hughes 
sued in breach of contract claiming the tender process breached an implied term 
that the tender would be conducted  fairly and according to the defined criteria. 
Finn J found for Hughes stating: 
 
"1 have to say I regard the case for implication as overwhelming. 
Fairness in process and dealing was the a prioi of this business 
relationship.  Without  the  assurance  of  fairness,  there  would  have 
been no contract. Despite the criticisms of nebulous language, it was 
the actual language of the parties: it was intended to convey meaning 
and to be relied on. It was definite and capable of precise expression. 
And, in my view, it was 'so obvious  that [the parties] would clearly 
have agreed to its inclusion in the contract ... had they directed their 
mind to it at the time'. 
 
"Fairness  in evaluation was ... clearly perceived by the parties to be 
of encompassing importance. ... It was intended to be an obligation in 
its own right."99 
 
Part of his Honour's decision rested upon the nature of what is expected in the 
tendering process. Finn J found an implied term of the tender process required 
fair evaluation and that the CAA acted in breach of contract with Hughes in that 
it failed to evaluate according to the proscribed priorities and methodologies.100 
Good faith required of the CAA that it turn its mind to the relative strengths of 
the contending parties. 
 
How, then, does this relate to sporting selection? On almost all imaginable 
occasions the failure to act in good faith is due to the desire of the organisation 
(or selector) to achieve an extraneous purpose. This extraneous purpose may 
extend from nepotism to animosity to cost savings. Essentially the motivation is 
unimportant- the breach of good faith occurs whenever the organisation does not 
act  in  good  faith  -  even  if  done  for  no  reason  whatsoever. Wherever the 
organisation seeks to achieve an extraneous purpose, ceteris  paribus,  it is in 




98 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR I. 
99 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR 1 at [35]. 
100 Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia (1997) 146 ALR I at [118]. 
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It is worth, at this point, reflecting  upon the proposition  that a contractual  term 
promising  the benefit of a contract extension, a bonus, or some other advantage 
upon playing a certain number of games, is a form of consideration. In return for 
the organisation's implied promise of good faith performance the athlete is 
motivated  to play well and train rigorously in the anticipation that he or she will 
be  selected   and  attain  the  necessary  number  of  games.  In  this  sense  the 
organisation  receives  full benefit from the contractual  term - a term obviously 
intended for purposes of player motivation. By conducting itself male fide the 





This paper argues that an athlete's  entitlement to team selection is one based on 
the agreed terms governing the selection process. These terms may be expressed 
or implied, or a combination  of both. The express terms are criteria determining 
an objective  standard  that must be achieved by the athlete to be selected  in the 
team. Generally these criteria require an athlete to run faster, throw further or to 
defeat  an opponent.  An athlete  wishing  to challenge  his or  her non-selection 
requires proof that the expressed criteria were not followed. 
 
Where  the selection of athletes is left to the judgment  of selectors, the process 
may be described as "subjective". Under subjective regimes there are no express 
criteria  and  entry  to  the  team  depends  on  the opinion  of  selectors  as to  the 
relative   worth  of   the  contending   athlete.   Under   these   regimes   an  athlete 
aggrieved  at non-selection  must prove he or she was not selected  despite being 
the more meritorious athlete. 
 
It is argued that the implied terms governing the processes of subjective selection 
are amenable to the formulation for implication given in the cases of BP Refinery 
(Westernport)  and  Codelfa  Constructions  v  State  Rail  Authority.  Where  an 
athlete is not selected on merit to successfully challenge the selection  he or she 
must point to a breach of the implied  terms where such terms are necessary to 
give business efficacy  to the contract and are so obvious that incorporation  goes 
without  saying.  It  is  also  argued  that  a  term  of "merit  selection"  is  implied 
through   the  processes  of  contract  construction.  Under  this  formulation   the 
aggrieved athlete proposes that the word "selection" conveys, through the factual 
matrix  of the sport  in question,  that selection is merit based and was again not 
applied. 
 
Regimes of subjective selection involve selectors  in the exercise of a discretion. 
It is argued that this discretion is not unfettered but must, as a matter of contract 
implication,   be  exercised   with  an  honest  appraisal  of  the  relative  worth  of 
contending   athletes  rather  than  to  secure  a  collateral  purpose.  It  is  further 
suggested   that  whilst  selectors  must  be  honest  in  their  appraisal  there  is  no 
contractual obligation to be objectively reasonable. 
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Subjective selection also requires selectors to abide by the implied obligation of 
good faith. In this sense selectors are to make determinations with honest regard 
to the purposes to be achieved through the selection and to avoid restraining 
athletes from accessing the benefits of the contract. It is suggested, however, that 
there is no good faith requirement for selectors to be objectively reasonable in 
making selections; in essence, provided  selectors seek to benefit the team they 
are acting bona fide. 
 
For athletes like Kirk Reynoldson, the rugby league player excluded from the 
Newcastle club one game short of securing a new contract, non-selection can be 
expensive  and career ending. There  is evident  difficulty in knowing  whether a 
selection  is made bona  fide  or  to secure  an extraneous  purpose;  the more so 
where reasons for selection  are not made public. Nonetheless,  where evidence 
can be adduced to show an objective selection was made without recourse to the 
written  criteria  or  where,  under a subjective  regime  of  selection,  the  implied 
terms are abandoned or the athlete is denied  full contractual  entitlement  under 
the contractual obligation of good faith, that athlete may seek to redress their 
exclusion as a matter of breach of contract. 
